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INTRODUCTION
Critical Legal Studies (C.L.S.) launched an offensive against our tradi-
tional notions of legal theory and interpretation that has mounted to an
onslaught.1 At the same time, the credibility of the movement has slipped.2
The combination appears paradoxical, but its cause is straightforward:
While the C.L.S. critique is penetrating,' the positive program offered by
Critical scholars has been less convincing." The movement's success has
1. A recent bibliography of "C.L.S.-type works" compiled by Karl Klare and Duncan Kennedylists over 180 authors and more than 500 articles and books. Kennedy & Klare, A Bibliography of
Critical Legal Studies, 94 YALE L.J. 461, 462 (1984).
2. Phillip Johnson expresses a popular sentiment, albeit antagonistically, when he asks whether
the Critical Legal Studies movement is a "Peter Pan syndrome," and concludes that its members areproducts of the 1960's who are "[pilaying with Marxism" because they want to be radicals but have
not learned how. Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want To Be Radical?, 36 STAN. L. REv. 247, 248, 291(1984). See also Schwartz, With Gun and Camera Through Darkest CLS-Land, 36 STAN. L. REv.
413, 421 (1984) (C.L.S. fails to present "credible left" critique).
3. The deconstructive enterprise of C.L.S. has been exhaustively argued for and against; this Notedoes not attempt to reproduce that debate. For strong presentations of the deconstructionist critique,
see Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REv. 57 (1984); Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L.REV. 293 (1984); Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 H.uv. L. REv. 561 (1983). For
responses critical of the deconstruction, see Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REv.739 (1982); Johnson, supra note 2, at 247; Sparer, Fundamental Human Rights, Legal Entitle-
ments, and the Social Struggle: A Friendly Critique of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 36
STAN. L. REV. 509 (1984). Critical deconstruction is, of course, far from the first critique to target
claims of formalism, determinism, neutrality or objectivity in legal theory. Such criticism has been
articulated for many years by Legal Realists and other scholars. For the Realist approach, see, e.g., J.
FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (Anchor Books ed. 1963); Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense
and the Functional Approach, 35 COLIuM. L. Rzv. 809 (1935); Llewellyn, Some Realism about
Realism, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1222 (1931). For a different perspective, see, e.g., R. SEIDMAN, THE
STATE, LAW, AND DEVELOPMENT 379, 464 (1978) (analyzing law as instrument of state). The Criti-
cal scholars have, however, distinguished themselves by pressing their criticisms with special intransi-
gence through an urgent and confrontational presentation.
4. The frequent charge that C.L.S. does not even have a positive program is neither a strong
claim nor an accurate one. First, as William Simon correctly points out, Critical scholars have as
much right, one might say duty, as social scientists do to describe the system they perceive. Simon,
Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REv. 469, 502 (1984). Second, several positiveprograms have in fact been suggested. Duncan Kennedy and Joseph Singer sincerely believe, like their
philosophical counterpart, Richard Rorty, that a world in which we give up trying to construct ab-
stractions or acquire "objective" knowledge would be a positive development. See Gabel & Kennedy,
Roll Over, Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1, 36-55 (1984); Singer, The Players and the Cards: Nihil-ism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L. J. 1 (1984); R. RORTY, PMLOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF
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come in deconstructing the objective and formal quality of our law, and in
piercing the myth of our autonomy as legal agents.5 Yet its prescriptive
faith in our human capacity to create new and better societies when freed
from the disempowering mystification of our present system seems to
many to be naive, vague, or ill-formed.
6
Skepticism about the Critical conclusion may obscure revelations made
during Critical deconstruction because C.L.S. itself has never persuasively
incorporated into its vision for the future the lessons it has exposed from
our past. Critical scholars have reacted against the image that significantly
informs our present legal and social structures-an image of atomized in-
dividuals linked in their relations by some invisible social contract or
mega-marketplace.' The Critical movement and those who admit its criti-
cisms as significant must now more fully examine the alternative-the
possibility of subjects who create their own contexts interdependently and
endlessly. In analyzing the alternative, the group must also more fully
face the self it finds in each context, a self who insists on objectifying the
constructs it creates.
I. DECONSTRUCTION OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM AND ITS SUBJECT
The pattern of the Critical enterprise is by now familiar, though the
claim that it is one bifurcated in both sequence and success (penetrating
critique followed by less persuasive prescription) requires amplification.
C.L.S. begins its critique strongly, incisively deconstructing or "trashing"
our allegedly cohesive legal system by demonstrating its inconsistencies
and exploiting its contradictions." The exercise aims to expose law as a
human construct whose partisan nature is masked by objectification, or
"sanctification," the elevation of subjective understandings to the status of
NATURE (1979). Unger has suggested his own program through which humans could develop their
personal and political potential. See Unger, supra note 3. Other Critical scholars have suggested more
specific reform proposals. See Kelman, supra note 3, at 299-303 (proposals surveyed).
5. See, e.g., Heller, Structuralism and Critique, 36 STAN. L. REv. 127 (1984) (comparing con-
ception of individual agent in liberalism with counterpart in structuralist worldviews); Simon, supra
note 4 (refuting notion of lawyer as independent agent); see also Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruc-
tion of Contract Doctrine 94 YALE L. J. 997, 1006-09 (1985) (identifying as unsubstantiated liberal
claim to mediate human relationships clearly). The unsatisfactory nature of current conceptions of the
individual has been a strong theme in Roberto Unger's work. See Unger, supra note 3, at 584-88; R.
UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND PoLrrIcs 29-62, 191-96 (1975); R. UNGER, PASSION: AN ESSAY ON
PERSONALITY (1984); see infra note 16.
6. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 2, at 249, 256-65, 281-91.
7. Id. at 256 (stating image from liberal perspective); Unger, supra note 3, at 567-70 (stating
image from Critical perspective).
8. "Trashing" is deconstruction in an irreverent mood, as evinced in the definition of the opera-
tion that follows: "Take specific arguments very seriously in their own terms; discover they are actu-
ally foolish ([tragi]-comic); and then look for some (external observer's) order (not the germ of truth)
in the internally contradictory, incoherent chaos we've exposed." Kelman, supra note 3, at 293 (em-
phasis in original).
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objective standards.9 Through objectification, the law achieves an illusory
but intimidating authority. It appears to be the embodiment of a neutral
or natural ethic, a "given" structure, rather than a contingent construc-
tion. The hierarchies that the law guards, institutionalized in our society,
likewise appear to be natural and necessary, rather than the malleable
creations of men"0 that they actually are."
Critical scholars identify the legal structure objectified and protected by
this sanctifying operation to be liberal jurisprudence-a jurisprudence
that sets as an aspirational ideal a society of free and equal individuals.' 2
In a move that makes their deconstructive enterprise complete, Critical
scholars blast the assumption behind the ideal itself: They reject the lib-
eral definition of the human being as an independent, self-defining
agent.'" That is, they dismiss as an unsuccessful apologist for the present
system its central actor-the autonomous subject whose natural habitat is
one of freedom of contract and property rights.14
It is entirely possible to justify the dissection of the legal structure and
its architect as an exercise in description, a social science function man-
dated by that discipline's drive to analyze behavior. Most Critical scholars
however, present their action as a social service as well, because there are
normative implications of the exercise they would like to draw out. 5
First, in revealing the contingency of our present system by refuting its
objectification, they hope to empower people to create new and fairer soci-
9. Unger, supra note 3, at 571.
10. The significance of gender here is a point well made in feminist legal theory. See, e.g., Mac-
Kinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS: J
VOMEN CULTURE & Soc'y 635, 636, 644-45 (1983).
11. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 3, at 109-13.
12. Political scientist David Apter describes the "classic liberal picture" of a political community:
Behaviorally, the. . . model consists of units that possess two capacities: the ability to rea-
son and the ability to know self-interest. . . . Structurally, the system must allow maximum
opportunity for the exercise of rationality and the pursuit of self-interest: Hence the emphasis
is on a framework that will prevent coercion and provide limited government. The usual reali-
zation of this need is a system of representative government with checks and balances designed
to prevent tyranny. Normatively, such a system takes certain fundamental proprieties as given.
D. APTER, THE POLITICS OF MODERNIZATION 28 (1965) (emphasis in original). This Note will
assume a definition of liberal jurisprudence that accords with such a model. See, e.g., Heller, supra
note 5, at 132 n.12. Such jurisprudence has often been linked to market and contract forms of social
organization, according to which the most sophisticated defenses and elaborations of liberal political
theory have been made. See, e.g., F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960) (free market
model); R. NoZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974) (free market model); J. RAwLS, A THE-
ORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (social contract model). For additional definitions of liberal jurisprudence
forwarded recently, see e.g., Gordon, supra note 3, at 59-65; Johnson, supra note 2, at 256; Sparer,
supra note 3, at 516-22.
13. See supra note 5.
14. See, e.g., Dalton, supra note 5, at 1006-07, 1113-14 and passim (deconstructing contract
doctrine); Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 205 (1979)
(deconstructing Blackstone's scheme of legal classification).
15. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 4, at 506-07.
The Yale Law Journal
etal arrangements.1 And, having identified as ideology our legal and so-
cial autonomy, they advocate arrangements oriented towards beings who
are fundamentally interdependent rather than individuals seeded in a
competitive hierarchy.
17
The aspiration sounds appealing. However, it is not quite convincing.
The interdependent subject with the creative potential remains a vague,
somewhat furtive hero hidden within the liberal subject. When the inner
figure is revealed, Critical investigation fails to explicate adequately an
attribute just as outstanding as the figure's creative ability-its persistence
in confining itself within the legal structures it creates.' Although there
are lessons to be drawn from the Critical dismantling of our legal system,
that structure has not disappeared for all its intellectual devastation. Lib-
eralism presents not only a specific ideology, but also a striking example
of a system objectified by its society. Clearly, the phenomenon of objectifi-
cation cannot simply be dismissed,19 nor does a faith in our ability to
transcend the structures it defines appear to be spreading.2
The observations above set an agenda for those who would admit and
seek to incorporate the insights generated in the debate over liberal legal-
ity. We must draw out, first, the implications of a subject who is an inter-
subjective creator"' rather than an autonomous agent. Subsequently, after
admitting objectification to be an operation pervasively used to conceal the
subjectivity of the social and legal structures we create, we need to investi-
gate why objectification is so widely available as a mask and means of
manipulation. That is, we must move beyond arguing the fact of objectifi-
cation to addressing its motive as well.22 Until then we will remain with
16. According to Unger, as deconstruction demonstrates that there is not one necessary and natu-
ral legal structure, it also reveals a definition of the self in terms of its "power . . . eternally to
transcend the limited imaginative and social worlds that it constructs." Unger, supra note 3, at 587.
See also Gabel & Kennedy, supra note 4, at 32-33 (noting pacifying potential of rights doctrine);
Simon, supra note 4, at 503-07 (advocating demystification as lawyerly function).
17. Unger is the Critical scholar who describes human interdependence most fully, giving it a
deep psychological basis. His image of the self, torn between fear of and longing for the other, is
developed in R. UNGER, PASSION, supra note 5. Critical scholars advocate non-hierarchical social
arrangements as ideal for such interdependent beings. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 4, at 485; Unger,
supra note 3, at 585.
18. Objectification has been categorized most commonly by the Critical school as a problem rather
than a human characteristic. It thus appears an obstacle that can be resolved, given the correct solu-
tion. The antidote most frequently suggested within the school is the institution of non-hierarchical
social arrangements, on the theory that objectification occurs because the powerful pacify those below
them with such "hallucination[s]" as rights-based structures. Gabel & Kennedy, supra note 4, at
33-34. Recognizing that objectification is not only imposed but continually generated from within,
Kennedy swears off abstract characterization as a whole, positing freedom to be only and ever in the
interstices of structures. Id. at 53. Neither conclusion is fully responsive to the continuing force ex-
erted by objectification.
19. See infra note 24.
20. See supra note 16.
21. See infra text accompanying note 28.
22. See supra note 18.
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theories and aspirations that are neither sociologically realistic nor psycho-
logically responsive.
II. INTERSUBJECTIVITY AND OBJECTIFICATION
C.L.S. has not been alone in questioning the autonomy of the individ-
ual,23 nor in confronting its objectifying tendency. 24 In fact, the debate in
the legal arena appears fledgling relative to inquiries into intersubjectivity
and objectification made in other fields.25 These non-legal theories, and
the areas of conflict, agreement, and complementarity that connect them,
contain noteworthy implications for our concept of law and our role in
shaping it. Such is the hypothesis that guides the following exploration
into two different approaches to intersubjectivity and objectification (Sec-
tion II) and that justifies the application to law of a composite generated
by that exploration (Section III).
23. Two penetrating critiques of liberalism from a communitarian perspective are A.
MACINTYRE, AFrER VIRTUE (1981), and M. SAND.L, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE
(1982). For a proposal that attempts to move us beyond the perceived impasse of liberal individualism,
see Cornell, Toward a ModernlPostmodern Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 291
(1985).
24. The deconstructionist legal argument is closely paralleled by a philosophical form. Richard
Rorty, a noted deconstructionist philosopher, is also engaged in demonstrating to us that our quest for
objective knowledge is misguided. Rorty points first to the failure of the Enlightenment Project-the
attempt made during the last three centuries to find objective truth (i.e., final answers) by applying to
areas including morality, law, and history the empirical approach that seemed to ensure success for
science. Rorty then asserts even scientific knowledge to be relative by following the line of argument
developed by Thomas Kuhn: Our apparently stable scientific knowledge becomes just the latest in a
series of theories, simply the story about reality that happens to be the one most currently accepted.
For both Unger and Rorty, the human is singular for his or her tremendous creative potential.
Unger identifies the person as "a being whose most remarkable quality is precisely the power to
overcome and revise . . . every social or mental structure in which he moves," Unger, supra note 3,
at 585, while Rorty characterizes him or her to be most fundamentally the generator of an infinite
number of descriptions that are varied, interesting, and ultimately incommensurable. R. RORTY,
supra note 4, at 378. For Rorty, the belief in objective knowledge-the declaration that one model of
reality (or one legal system) correctly mirrors nature-is a most dangerous mistake. Such a belief
silences the diversity of discourse that is distinctive to humankind. Thus we should recognize and
reject our search for objectivity, dismissing it as an unnecessary and harmful folly. Id. at 315-94. See
also Singer, supra note 4, for an application of Rorty's argument to legal theory.
25. Heller, supra note 5, reviews issues in the wide-ranging debates occurring in philosophy and
linguistics. Controversy is also full-blown in the fields of sociology, e.g., P. WINCH, THE IDEA OF A
SOCIAL SCIENCE AND ITS RELATION TO PHILOSOPHY (1958) (contending that sociologists must grasp
unreflective understanding of community members before making detached evaluations), literary criti-
cism, e.g., S. FISH, Is THERE A TExT IN THIS CLASS? (1980) (arguing that understanding and
socially-mediated interpretation occur simultaneously), political science, e.g., H. ARENDT, THE
HUMAN CONDITION (1958) (asserting political (public) interaction as condition for individual free-
dom), and even the natural sciences, e.g., T. KUHN, STRUCTURE OF SCIaTrsCri REVOLUTIONS (en-
larged 2d ed. 1970) (describing scientific "knowledge" to be defined by socially-dominant paradigm).
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A. Reconstruction of the Subject
1. Establishing Intersubjectivity
Studies of the self and its language have generated an increasing num-
ber of theories with a common theme-the depth and extent of human
interdependence. One of the most compelling of these is Jurgen
Habermas' theory of communicative action.26 The theory suggests that our
interrelations determine not only the languages we speak but the very
images of reality we adopt.
Habermas clears the ground for his model by dispelling our compla-
cency about the way reality is organized. He attacks the subject/object
dichotomy we conventionally assume, exploding it by arguing that there
are not two but three dimensions to our world: the subjective, the objec-
tive, and the social. Habermas suggests that these three axes offer coordi-
nates according to which we locate and thus are able to discriminate and
categorize facts, norms, and experiences.27
Language offers the medium: Using it to negotiate descriptions of our
situation with others, we arrive at definitions of reality that will be inter-
subjectively recognized and thus validated. That is, our interpretations of
the world are formed through the cooperative process of "communicative
action,'" 2 8 and are thus dependent in a fundamental way on the interpre-
tations of our colleagues. Understanding, the crucial goal, is achieved as
each communicant endlessly, though often unconsciously, recognizes and
evaluates reasons for claims made by others, while asserting reasons for
claims of his or her own. The primacy of reasoning gives the operation its
name, "communicative rationality,"29 and reveals the condition for its
fully successful execution-an atmosphere free from coercions in which
the sole force is that of the better argument. This atmosphere, the "ideal
speech situation," is profoundly important to the theory of communicative
action, as both its basic presupposition and its central aspiration.
3 0
Habermas establishes a model that expands our notion of the way peo-
26. This discussion will draw on Habermas' theory as it is most recently presented, in J.
HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNIcATIVE AcTrON: REASON AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF
SociETY (1981).
27. Id. at 70. This sketch, which obviously fails to do Habermas' theory justice, reviews material
in the first section of his book. Id. at 1-141.
28. Id. at 86.
29. Id. at 10 (term introduced), and 17-22 (term further explained).
30. Id. at 25. For an earlier formulation and an expert commentary, see, respectively, J.
HABERmAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS 107-08 (1975); T. MCCARTHY, THE CRrrCAL THEORY OF
JURGEN HABERMAS 322-25 (1978). Such a speech situation is indeed an "ideal," one perhaps attain-
able only in degree: The less coercive are the conditions, the more will communicative rationality, and
the understanding it achieves, flourish. The aspiration is not, however, separated from practice.
Rather, the presupposition of ideal speech underlies all communication, since all speech is "oriented
towards the idea of truth." Id. at 323 (quoting Habermas).
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ple construct society and its laws, developing the liberal free agent into a
subject who defines his or her universe dependently and in dialogue, a
communicator whose understanding correlates with the degree to which
uncoerced exchange is possible. The route the model directs in practice,
however, looks surprisingly familiar. It implies the creation of a truly
open political process-the same ideal that underlies a theory of constitu-
tional democracy like that of John Hart Ely.3" Both Habermas and Ely
recognize the tremendous importance of participation in the communica-
tively-achieved structuring of society. Both therefore sanctify the right of
all members of a political community to contribute to public decisions.32
Their theories share certain areas of underemphasis as well. Both
Habermas' concentration on the free exercise of reason and choice and
Ely's focus on open access to the political forum found a right of partici-
pation but inadequately explicate the responsibility of receptivity that is
an essential ingredient of constructive exchange.3 3 And, stressing the pro-
cess of decision-making, in politics or communication," neither author
confronts the issue that towards whom we bear that responsibility requires
a substantive answer.3 5 Even Habermas' stipulation that communicative
31. J. ELY, DEMOcRACY AND DLmusT (1980).
32. Drucilla Cornell, who uses Habermas' theory in developing a communitarian model, similarly
emphasizes "participatory rights" and an ethic of involved citizenship. See Cornell, supra note 23, at
368, 374.
33. The point here is one of relative emphasis, for neither writer ignores the element. Ely is
highly sensitive to the fact that "a voice and a vote" are devices insufficient to assure receptivity to the
views of minorities and dissonant individuals in a representative democracy. J. ELY, supra note 31, at
135. He notes the existence of additional aids to such members: the guarantees offered by the Bill of
Rights, the pluralistic structure of government, and the policy of "virtual representation" (the strategy
of linking representatives' interests to those of their constituents). Id. at 79-84. However, because
vulnerable members are precisely those "to whose needs and wishes elected officials have no apparent
interest in attending" and those who may be unable to gain political leverage for "reasons that are in
some sense discreditable," (e.g., prejudice), Ely depends most heavily on the courts to identify and
protect such members by invalidating discriminatory legislation. Id. at 151, 152-53. Yet given his
assertion elsewhere that the courts are likely to evidence a "systematic bias ... in favor of the values
of the upper-middle, professional class from which most judges and lawyers ... are drawn" and the
fact that even protective judicial acts may well leave minority members stymied as far as affirmative
political action is concerned, the conclusion is less than satisfying. Id. at 59.
Habermas is obviously well aware that communication depends on receptivity, on listening to as
well as contributing and choosing propositions. It is a premise of his theory of communicative action
that communicants are, at a most basic level, oriented toward understanding one another, a mutually
beneficial goal that can be achieved only cooperatively. J. HABEtMAS, supra note 26, at 10-11. Yet
beyond noting that prejudices amount to "coercion" in the ideal speech situation because they block
the fair hearing of others' views, see supra note 30 and accompanying text, Habermas devotes little
more discussion to receptivity. He thus appears to presume too easily the occurrence in practice of a
quality clearly intrinsic to the operation of reason in theory. See infra text accompanying notes 41-48,
85-101, for the responsibility of receptivity to which I contrast the listening element admittedly inher-
ent to communicative action or a process theory of democracy.
34. See, e.g., J. ELY, supra note 31, at 74-75; J. HABERMAS, supra note 26, at 17-18, 249.
35. As Michael Walzer points out, theories of distributive justice often simply assume an estab-
lished population and thus avoid having to answer what is actually "the first and most important
distributive question" faced by a community-the selection of its members. M. WALZER, SPHERES OF
JUSTICE 31 (1983); cf. J. ELY, supra note 31, at 181 (process theory differentiated from theory
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action includes all humans as communicants," while satisfying in theory,
accomplishes little as a directive in practice. Political conversation has in
the past been comfortably confined to one race or one community; its insu-
.larity cannot be pierced by blunt assertion, but must be subjected to more
focused argument.
If we are left with a concept of intersubjectivity curiously lacking in
innovative implications, it is only because Habermas assumes too much of
language, the medium of that intersubjectivity. A school of hermeneutics
radically skeptical of the autonomous subject, forcefully represented by
Martin Heidegger, uncovers the assumptions and unpacks them.3 7
2. Developing Intersubjectivity
In contributing insight into the selectivity of language, Heidegger helps
to develop the difference between a model of intersubjectivity and one of
autonomy. His idea can be stated with a simplicity that is somewhat mis-
leading. Although it is the only way that humans can articulate reality, as
language names things, it necessarily delimits them, restricting and in that
sense distorting what is there to be discussed. 8 The distortion occurs be-
cause language leaves out certain aspects of any subject. These aspects are
not articulated as-and thus not granted the status of-reality. The case
of vision presents a helpful analogy. In order to see anything, we must see
from an angle. While the angle enables our vision, it also limits it, defin-
ing our view and determining its highlights. 9
This understanding of language reaffirms the dismantling of the sub-
ject/object dichotomy with which our discussion of intersubjectivity
started. Speech becomes a continual decision of what to reveal, thus also a
selective interpretation that obscures what is not spoken. It is only as man
loses sight of the dynamic nature of this phenomenon that he imagines the
world to be "the Object," capable of full and accurate description by man,
"the Subject."4
The Heideggerian notion represents a critical insight if Habermas is
focused on substantive merits, selection of members not discussed).
36. See J. HABERMAS, supra note 26, at 8; see also T. MCCARTHY, supra note 30, at 299
(quoting Habermas).
37. The discussion here is drawn from Martin Heidegger's presentation of the ideas in AN IN-
TRODUCTION TO ME-'TAPHYSICS (1959). My understanding and expression of Heidegger's orientation
have been significantly influenced by my exposure to Wilfrid Desan, who advances an approach simi-
lar in some respects. See W. DESAN, THE PLANETARY MAN (1961).
38. See M. HEIDEGGER, supra note 37, at 52-92, 156-58, 170-96; M. HEIDEGGER, ExISTENCE
AND BEING 313, 319 (Gatewood ed. 1949).
39. See, e.g., M. HEIDEGGER, supra note 37, at 104-05, 117. This image is also employed and
explored by Desan. See W. DESAN, supra note 37, at 33-43 (emphasizing extent of human
"angularity").
40. See M. HEIDEGGER, supra note 37, at 156-58, 188-206. I use the male referents here advis-
edly, because they are prominent terms in Heidegger's writing.
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correct that dialogue is the keystone to human understanding of the world.
In maintaining that only by communication do humans interpret real-
ity-separating out the objective, subjective, and social in order to organ-
ize their world into facts, experiences, and norms-Habermas assumes
that language is capable of fully expressing the raw materials of that real-
ity.4 ' In contrast, Heidegger argues that language is already a decision
concerning meaning, a decision that distinguishes some things by casting
others into shadow.
The qualification need not undermine Habermas' concept; it can
strengthen it. Habermas, with his affirmative focus on our ability to
achieve understanding through communication, inadequately explains the
fact that our discourses are sometimes undeniably incommensurable.42
That is, translation-for Habermas the act that prototypically reveals ra-
tionality to be a universal operation 4 3-is sometimes quite unable to repli-
cate and convey meaning accurately." The Heideggerian notion of the
selectivity of language resolves the problem. Incommensurability of human
discourse is revealed to be a function of the fact that to speak (as to see)
we must speak from an angle. We therefore express different or undenia-
bly "incommensurable," if not unrelated, realities.
Recognizing the inherent selectivity of language extends the implica-
tions of an intersubjective model.45 First, receptivity becomes as important
as speech. While before there was a reason to dialogue-to define our
world-there is now a responsibility inherent in the dialogue-to realize
and challenge the constant selectivity of our own interpretation. That is,
while we had a motive to converse in order to validate our vision of the
world, we now must recognize a need to listen to the visions of others,
because there are whole dimensions of reality that we are unable to see.
Even our capacity for critical reflection becomes dependent on the reality
that we can learn from them, for our own information will always be
incomplete. 46 Thus truths discovered, whether by Dworkin's Hercules or
41. See T. MCCARTHY, supra note 30, at 316 (reviewing Habermas' supposition that language is
adequate to make "inner-natures transparent").
42. See supra note 24; infra note 44.
43. See J. HABERMAS, supra note 26, at 131-36.
44. Nor are the resulting incommensurabilities negligible. For Rorty, they found the definition of
humanity. We become most fundamentally "generators of new descriptions" of reality, descriptions
that are not ultimately "commensurable": They cannot be compared or evaluated because no one
description can claim the privilege that would identify it as a measure. R. RORTY, supra note 4, at
378. The Critical echo of this is, of course, the conviction that if freed from the idea that a particular
structure is standard, humans can create an infinite number of social and legal structures.
45. See supra text accompanying notes 31-37.
46. A continuing debate between Habermas and Hans-Georg Gadamer has made clear that the
concept of selectivity introduced here critically alters Habermas' theory and that Habermas would
object to the alteration. Both men start from agreement concerning the importance of our contextual-
ity-our location in a certain community at a certain time-in forming our concept of reality.
Habermas contends that once we realize our contextuality, and thus understand that our construction
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according to Unger's deviationist doctrine,47 can never be other than par-
tial and particular-though they can indeed claim to be this somewhat
more humble type of truth.
48
Second, realization of the incompleteness of our vision explodes the in-
sular potential of communicative theory. It is those whose situations are
most different from our own who can illuminate most effectually our ar-
eas of blindness; therefore it is those who are most different whom we
must be certain to include in our dialogue.
B. Objectification
With the acceptance of a subject whose understanding of the world and
the self is developed through dialogue and dependent on, as well as lim-
ited by, contextuality, it becomes ever more necessary to examine objectifi-
cation. The pervasive and stubborn tendency may reveal something of its
author, an agent who becomes ever more important with the loss of "ob-
jectivity," or rather, with its rediagnosis as a reality humanly defined.
1. Locating Objectification
Habermas posits that the objective, social, and subjective spheres which
constitute our worlds all consist of understandings negotiated according to
"communicative rationality," a process procedurally similar in each case.
of reality is shot through with certain prejudices, those prejudices cease to convince us. See T. Mc-
CARTHY, supra note 30, at 182. Habermas' faith in this illuminating power of critical reflection is
based on his belief that language can completely express even our "inner-natures" and that all lin-
guistically-made claims can then be fully assessed, and accepted or rejected, according to our faculty of
communicative rationality. Id. at 316 (quoting Habermas).
Gadamer argues instead that no amount of critical reflection can allow us to transcend our contexts
in this way. As McCarthy explains:
The reflecting subject inevitably takes for granted a host of concepts, judgments, principles,
and standards. . . he cannot call everything into question all at once. Thus critique is neces-
sarily partial and from a particular point of view. If the critical point of view is itself subjected
to reflection, this is inevitably done from another point of view and on the basis of other taken-
for-granted presuppositions.
Id. at 187. Gadamer asserts that it is only by striving to understand interpretations or articulations of
reality different from our own that we can recognize the selectivity of our constructs and thus push
outward, though never transcend, the bounds of our own contexts. The key is an openness to the
beliefs of others and a preparedness to learn from them. Id. at 169-93 (excellent summary of
Habermas-Gadamer debate).
47. Unger's "deviationist doctrine" is a form of internal critical development. One starts with
conflicting ideals extant in society, imagines their flawed actualizations transformed (perhaps by being
extended in application), and uses these hypothetical embodiments to revise the original ideals. Unger,
supra note 3, at 576-80.
48. Unger recognizes such a limitation. He identifies both "Illegal doctrine rightly understood and
practiced" and normative argument generally as forms of internal critique described by deviationist
doctrine. Id. at 580. See also M. Walzer, Tanner Lectures, Harv. Univ. (Nov. 13-14, 1985) (sug-
gesting similar dynamic to characterize social criticism). The source of authority for claims in such
contexts immediately becomes an issue: "Short of claiming access to authoritative revelation or privi-
leged intuition," deviationist doctrine "lays claim to no privileged status capable of distinguishing it
clearly from ideological dispute." Unger, supra note 3, at 580, 582.
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Yet each sphere has a specific rationality that is substantively distinct,49
because the standard according to which claims in each sphere are evalu-
ated varies. In the objective realm, where subject confronts object (e.g.,
scientific or empirical investigation), claims are made to truth or success.
In the subjective realm, where subject expresses experiences (e.g., aesthetic
expression), claims are to sincerity. And in the social realm, where subject
interacts with subject (e.g., moral theory, law), claims are to rightness. 50
According to Habermas, current mischaracterization of the way reality
is organized-according to a subject/object dichotomy-has resulted in the
misconceived notion that the rationality of the objective sphere is an ap-
propriate way to evaluate claims made according to other standards as
well.51 We "objectify" law when, overlooking the existence of the social
sphere with its moral-practical rationality, we evaluate legal issues as if
by objective standards.
Habermas' objection to conducting social reasoning (subject to subject)
according to objective methods (subject confronting object) is convincing.
However, Habermas succeeds in describing fully only the objective
method, or "cognitive-instrumental rationality," according to which the
subject has two relations to the world (representation and strategic action)
and two standards by which to make and judge claims (truth and suc-
cess). 52 Moral-practical rationality and its standard of rightness are left
49. J. HABERMAS, supra note 26, at 15.
50. Id. at 15-22. In Habermas' terms, the reasoning faculties of the objective, social, and subjec-
tive realms are, respectively, "cognitive-instrumental rationality" (strategic action and representation),
"moral-practical rationality" (moral, normative, or legal reasoning), and "aesthetic-practical dis-
course" (evaluation according to culturally-specific standards, thus not a form of assessment that mer-
its the label "rationality").
51. See, e.g., id. at 239-42. See also McCarthy, Translator's Introduction to J. HABERMAS,
supra note 26, at xxxvi-xxxvii.
52. Cognitive-instrumental rationality is given more explication and more emphasis from the very
start of Habermas' book. It is the sub-type rationality through which Habermas describes the more
general communicative rationality. J. HABERMAS, supra note 26, at 8-22. Within communicative
action itself, strategic action (an operation of cognitive-instrumental rationality) is prominent relative
to non-strategic, agreement-oriented speech. The human species is said to survive through socially-
coordinated activities, interventions coordinated through communication, but only "in certain central
spheres through communication oriented to reaching agreement." Id. at 397 (emphasis added). Later,
Habermas faults Weber for his contention that law can be legitimated only by procedure, arguing that
this limitation of law to cognitive-instrumental rationality fails. Consensus still depends on norma-
tively established limits. Id. at 264-71. But Habermas in turn asserts communicative rationality to be
strictly procedural. Id. at 249. If it is, it may suffice to explain its subset in type, cognitive-
instrumental rationality, but it is questionable whether it can suffice to explain moral-practical ration-
ality any more than Weber's rationality could explain law. Habermas also proposes that society needs
"switching stations" at which individuals can switch from one complex of rationality to another. Id. at
250. But is is unclear what these switching stations are, or how the logics of the different spheres do
in fact integrate. Perhaps we need to walt for Habermas' explanation of systems theory. But mean-
while we are left with the example of how cognitive-instrumental rationality alone operates, the sub-
systems in which it alone is institutionalized (e.g., economics, science), and the progress it alone has
demonstrated.
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vague, and with their overtones of universality, 3 are insufficiently distin-
guished from their objective counterparts. The fact of the mismeasurement
remains, however, located by Habermas as the problem presented by legal
reasoning.
2. Admitting Objectification
The complementarity identified above between Habermas' theory and
the Heideggerian approach presages the development that may be made
by exploring the latter's perspective on the problem of objectification. The
notion that language is a dynamic, selective, and influential operation
rather than merely a descriptive device correlates with an analogous model
of rationality. The same dynamism and selectivity that enable linguistic
expression also characterize thinking, Heidegger's "revealing." r Just as
man cannot articulate reality fully, neither does he "find it," complete and
detached. Rather, man as thinker forms and is in turn formed by the real-
ity he tries to understand. However, as with language, he forgets the dy-
namic nature of this operation. He perceives thinking to be only an in-
strument-the tool of man, the Subject, acting in and on his world, the
Object.
The implications suggested by this model of thought are significant:
The strategic use of thought (its use as an instrument) leads to the objecti-
fication of that human process-the treatment of thought as a detached,
objective, reasoning function. According to Heidegger, the apprehension is
inevitable,55and formative thinkers of the Frankfurt School, Max
Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, agree. They can suggest no form of
thought, save artistic expression, that can escape objectification. 56 It is
against their despair that Habermas reacts when he maintains that the
effect may be avoided by using the rationality of the objective sphere only
where appropriate-in science, not in law.57 The persuasive power of
Habermas' theory flags here, however, with its failure to distinguish ade-
quately the method of rationality to be used in the social sphere.58 It is
indeed more convincing that the faultline runs deeper: Objectification will
occur whenever reason is used as a tool by subjects to regulate the world
53. See, e.g., T. MCCARTHY, supra note 30, at 313-17, 325-33 (reviewing and commenting on
this characteristic in Habermas' theory).
54. For further explanation of the ideas summarized here, see M. HE.DEGGER, supra note 37, at
62-63, 135-46, 188-200.
55. See M. HEIDEGGER, supra note 37, at 187-96.
56. See J. HABERMAS, supra note 26, at 378-86 (summarizing views of Horkheimer and Adorno
on this point).
57. See id. at 345-99 (relating views of Horkheimer and Adorno to theory of communicative
action).
58. See supra note 52.
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around them. Such a conclusion most obviously implicates law. If we are
not to despair, nor escape here to a discussion of art, we must learn to
deal with the phenomenon of objectification.
III. LAW AS LANGUAGE
The debate between deconstructors and defenders of law can be retold
using the theories set forth above. But translation into the new terms does
not simply replicate the legal discussion, it recasts that discussion, leaving
distinctive implications. These implications can be reintegrated into and
thus affect the legal debate.
A. The Translation: Law as the Language of Power
Critical scholars have insisted that we recognize law as a specific set of
decisions about the way societal relations should be organized rather than
as an abstract ordering principle immanent in the relations of autonomous
individuals. Law gains a kind of monopolistic momentum: It is used to
bring about a certain organization, and is thereafter validated as standard
according to the order it itself has defined. To put it in the terms used in
Section II, a certain view of reality is communicatively constructed
through law. Though the view is selective, by its articulation it is accepted
as the real, the objective, because the articulation itself has delineated and
restricted the reality according to which the view is evaluated.
Law-the effort of humans to create a social order-becomes distinct
from its creators as it gains content with the articulation and realization of
that order. The separation is an inevitable product of the acquisition of
content, and the acquisition is equally necessary if the law is to fulfill its
central purpose-to accomplish social coordination by affecting humans.
Because law is so obviously an instrument, individuals lose sight of the
fact that it is also a subjective and creative process, itself constituent of the
order that it seeks to achieve. We ignore the agency of law, conceptualiz-
ing law simply as an object. Law becomes, to take a non-random example,
the elaborate expression of a social contract.
Restoring a formative and dynamic nature to law mandates an alterna-
tive conception of law. It requires law to be understood as the continuing
articulation of social order, a language itself, the language of power. 9 It is
the medium that seeks to translate power-of kinds random and fre-
59. It is important to stress that I am not talking here about the "language of law," either in the
sense used by Jerome Frank and others who focus on the legalistic terminology of law, or in the sense
of the recent debate concerning legal and literary interpretation. For these topics, see respectively, e.g.,
J. FRANK, supra note 3, at 24-34; Fiss, supra note 3; Symposium: Law and Literature, 60 TEX. L.
REv. 373 (1982).
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quently conflicting, destructive of social relations-into a certain order.
And it is the medium itself enabled by power-'"the power of decision" to
define the appropriate order and the power necessary to enforce that
decision.60
Conceptualizing law as such a language does not succeed in removing it
from objectification." The law remains an instrument, but it is a medium
rather than a thing (e.g., a legal "structure," "framework," or "system").
The difference is a substantial one, as a contrast with the classical liberal
approach reveals.
In A Theory ofJustice, John Rawls accomplishes a powerful revision of
the social contract theory set forth by Locke, Kant, and Rousseau.62 His
aim is to identify those principles of justice to which rational beings, gath-
ered behind a "veil of ignorance" as to their eventual interests, identities,
and endowments in society, would reasonably agree.6 Specifically, Rawls
delineates two principles, those of equality and difference,6 around which
he develops his theory.
That the ordering principle of a society is, ought to be, or can be analo-
gized to a contract between autonomous and abstract rational beings is
obviously incompatible with the approach focused on articulation-in lan-
guage, thought, or law-developed above. Locating Habermas' communi-
cative rationality within the individual humanized the operation, giving it
both blinders and vision: The essential point of Heidegger's insight is that
human rationality is both possible and selective precisely because it is sit-
uated. When Rawls dislocates rationality from any context of community
and history, he loses it, depersonalizing rather than purifying it. The re-
sult, predicts the law-as-language approach, will be a system powerful in
theory with far from universal resonance in practice.
But if it is incompatible with Rawls' contract theory as described in A
Theory of Justice, the concept of law-as-language must fully acknowledge
contract theory to be a profound expression of a specific society's legal
culture. It is significant that in his most recent work, 5 Rawls has re-
trenched his position to precisely such a stance. He cedes any claim that
60. Although definitions of law vary as widely as the scholars who have created them, law is
generally agreed to include a coercive element, the threat or fact of physical or other force. See, e.g., E.
HOEBEL, THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN: A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE LEGAL DYNAMICS 26 (1954);
S. MOORE, LAW AS PROCESS: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACH 10 (1978). A language of social
coordination, minus the coercive element, seems a workable description of morality or ethics. See S.
HAMPSHIRE, MORALITY AND CONFLICT 135-37 (1983).
61. But see R. Rorty, Science as Solidarity 10 (Dec. 13, 1984) (paper presented at Legal Theory
Workshop, Yale Law School). Rorty argues that we should simply "drop" objectification, a demand
that the analysis offered here suggests is unrealistic.
62. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11 (1971).
63. Id. at 12.
64. Id. at 14-15.
65. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223 (1985).
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his contract theory is founded on an abstract notion of rationality,6" identi-
fying as its basis instead "intuitive ideas" undeniably present in our cul-
ture, the most basic of which is a conception of society as a fair system of
cooperation between free and equal persons. 67 Rawls accepts certain im-
plications that follow from his position:" first, that social contract theory
thus conceived may have little power over someone from another culture;
and second, that beyond our borders, the application of the theory is am-
biguous.69 In terms of the law-conceived-as-language, Rawls is himself
identifying social contract theory as a powerful vocabulary in our particu-
lar language of law.
B. The Implications of the Law-as-Language
Agreement with Rawls' identification does not make possible a simple
return to a one-dimensional concept of law as an object. Rather, it makes
necessary an examination of the implications inherent in the notion of law
as a complex medium of power. Like language, law is admitted to be
communicatively constructed, selective, and systematically self-validating:
It must therefore be treated in a manner commensurate with these charac-
teristics. And like language, law is vulnerable to a test: Only as long as it
can express human needs as humans define them does any language re-
main adequate, any language of power remain legitimate.
I propose to measure our current vocabulary of law according to these
two propositions, the second of which seems the natural starting point.
How does liberal legality as a vocabulary rate in the social structure we
currently define and inhabit? That is, how successful is it in articulating a
social order compatible with the conditions of society and community we
presently construe? And, if current vocabulary is found to be inadequate,
how should our language change?
1. The Adequacy of the Liberal Vocabulary
Dennis Pirages posits that a profound transformation affecting eco-
nomic, political, ethical, and ecological outlooks is occurring worldwide.
For the first time, the limits of the globe have been reached; it has become
clear that its resources are finite and its inhabitants interdependent.7 0
66. Id. at 225.
67. Id. at 230-31.
68. These implications have been noted explicitly by Rawls. See Lecture by J. Rawls, Harv.
Univ. (Oct. 15, 1985); see also Rawls, supra note 65, at 225.
69. According to Rawls, application of his theory appears to indicate not so much some kind of
world government as a vision of an independent nation-state able to coexist peacefully with other
democratic states. Lecture by J. Rawls, supra note 68.
70. D. PMAGES, THE NEW CONTEXT FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: GLOBAL ECOPOLITICS
30 (1978).
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Pirages' message stands out only for its emphatic tone: In the fields of
political science and economics it is commonly perceived that the era of
insularity between nations is over.7 1 Most theories of psychology and soci-
ology refute the notion that such an era ever existed for individuals. 72 And
events appear to indicate that a model of autonomy no longer answers in
law.
I refer to the crisis that seems increasingly to deepen for liberalism. The
crisis is at least one of faith: In our culture it is manifest in Legal Realism
and in the Critical Legal Studies movement. It appears also to be one in
fact: the rise of the welfare state; the development of legal theories that
balance individual interests against values such as group parity and public
debate;71 court cases that mandate forced busing;74 the confusion that the
issue of affirmative action inspires;73 the retrenchment by Rawls of his
theory of justice 7"-these functionally deny the adequacy of a traditional
liberal ideology. Such ideology surely has its defenders in politics, the
academy, and the courts. But the continuing controversy itself is an indi-
cator that the liberal vocabulary no longer adequately expresses circum-
stances in our world.
The controversy also reveals popular attitudes towards remedying the
insufficiency, for a group can change its language in several ways. First, it
can shift to a completely different tongue.77 Such a switch might be ef-
fected in the language that is law by a revolution and the establishment of
a wholly new societal order.78 Second, a group can force its language to
expand, by requiring it to express previously neglected interpretations of
71. For a poetic description of the newly discovered limits of the globe, see H. ARENDT, supra
note 25, at 250. For a more pragmatic commentary, see WORLD DEV. REP. 1985, at iii, 169-229.
72. For a study that makes the point of our interdependence in an especially accessible way, see
E. GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959).
73. E.g., Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976); Fiss,
Free Speech and Social Structure, U. IowA L. REv. (forthcoming).
74. E.g., Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216 (D. Mass. 1975), aifd, 530 F.2d 401 (1st Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976).
75. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (plurality opinion striking
for its lack of clarity); M. SANDEI, supra note 23, at 135-47 (noting unfounded assumptions and
inconsistencies in argument for affirmative action suggested by R. Dworkin).
76. See supra text accompanying notes 65-69. The retrenched theory itself raises problems. For
example, Rawls' vision of independent nation-states coexisting peacefully with democratic counter-
parts, see supra note 69, is strikingly remote from our current reality-a dynamic of financial, politi-
cal, military, and material interdependency in which the United States has never been a neutral agent.
77. Gadamer would argue that even the adoption of a new language could be made only from the
reference point of the old. That is, the paradigm for the shift is one of translation, rather than one of
primary socialization. See supra note 46; see also T. MCCARTHY, supra note 30, at 171-74 (review-
ing Gadamer's argument).
78. The ideology of the American Revolution would appear to bear Gadamer out on his point, see
supra notes 46 & 77, that deliberate rejection and transformation is made according to existing refer-
ence points: The colonists insisted that rights embodied in the British constitution justified their rebel-
lion against Britain. See G. WOOD, THE CREnTON OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776,1787, at
12 (1969).
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reality.7 9 The first type of change would involve a wholesale repudiation
of our current law, a commitment widely belied by the continued presence
of the system's detractors, lay and legal, within the community. Advocacy
of radically new beginnings is rare compared to talk of radical transfor-
mation.s o A claim that the total population has been pacified by liberal
ideology is conceivable but unconvincing. It seems more realistic to read
popular reaction this way: Our law proved itself capable in the past of
extending to meet new situations (when we willed it); it may contain the
potential to continue that development. That is, the fact that liberalism
gave us a medium rich enough to create a social order of immense value
suggests that it may be possible and more constructive to expand that me-
dium than to abandon it.81
2. The Possibility and Places for Change in the Liberal Vocabulary
This possibility returns us to the first proposition about law-as-
language set forth above, that law be treated in a manner commensurate
with its characteristics as a medium.82 We can evaluate whether our legal
vocabulary does in fact have capacity for change, by examining whether
our law admits and builds on the characteristics that distinguish language
and allow it to grow. Specifically, we need to consider law according to
the aspects of language delineated in Section II: To what extent are con-
tributions sought to the continuing enterprise of the law's communicative
construction; to what extent is the selectivity of the construction recognized
and how is this selectivity dealt with; and in what manner and degree is
the objectification of the final construction acknowledged? The questions
yield a varying and revealing record.
a. Contributions to the Construction of Law
The right to participate or to contribute is a claim institutionalized
within our current legal structure. While a reality of general participation
remains to be realized, the ideal of this achievement is undoubtedly a cen-
tral tenet. To further that end, our system of checks and balances, theories
about process democracy, exaltation of free speech, and rights to represen-
79. See supra note 46 for a comparison between the development that can be achieved through
critical reflection and that enabled by interpretation of visions foreign to us. Although the two are not
mutually exclusive, it is only the second that reliably confronts us with the selectivity of our previous
thought: "Seriously to study another way of life is necessarily to seek to extend our own." T. Mc-
CARTHY, supra note 30, at 181 (quoting P. Winch).
80. E.g., Unger, supra note 3, at 580, 672-73. Unger's project is to create a system in which
radical revolution can be accomplished through transformation. Id. at 670.
81. Unger advocates "push[ing] the liberal premises about state and society," in order to reach a
"superliberalism." Unger, supra note 3, at 602.
82. See supra p. 983.
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tation before an independent judiciary were designed and a civil war
fought. That the participation ideal has been propagated within a liberal
framework does not make its results incompatible with a more intersub-
jective model: Progress made in facilitating contributions to law is legiti-
mate progress, whether made by beings who believe themselves autono-
mous or interdependent. For example, the "rights doctrine," a notion
rejected as a pacifying sham by some Critical scholars, 3 is a notion poten-
tially as suited to recognizing the unique visions of interdependent subjects
as to guarding the autonomy of each individual. 4 In short, the importance
of contribution is a theme articulated early in the American experience
and established as central since that time.
b. The Responsibility of Receptivity
As discussed above, and as demonstrated by our own history, the com-
municative construction of a "real" order, of objects or of human relations,
has an insular potential. But while the walls of language are generally
quite permeable, those built by law are topped with barbed wire. The
overcoming of the insular potential they contain comes only with the rec-
ognition of the selectivity of construction they represent. To be effective,
the recognition must be made by those in power, while they are in
power."5 If the law is to be responsive to all it affects (an aim explicit in
rationales justifying the right to contribute), it is the powerful who have
the responsibility to be receptive" towards the views of those dissimilarly
situated.87 Paradoxically, liberalism recognizes the essence of the obliga-
83. E.g., Kare, Labor Law as Ideology: Toward a New Historiography of Collective Bargaining
Law, 4 INDUs. Rnr. L.J. 450, 468-82 (1981). But see Gabel & Kennedy, supra note 4, at 26-36
(recognizing progress achieved by rights doctrine). For a defense of rights doctrine, see Sparer, supra
note 3.
84. See Unger, supra note 3, at 597-600 (proposing rights doctrine retailored to fit interdepen-
dent subjects).
85. Recognition of selectivity is advocated here as a responsibility that attaches to power. Such
recognition does not, therefore, equate with the resolve, also beneficial, to distribute or rotate power
regularly, the aim at the heart of the right to contribute.
86. Phillip Johnson is correct when he notes the importance of "tolerance" in our liberal system.
Johnson, supra note 2, at 277. Tolerance is necessarily the flip-side of a right to contribute. "Toler-
ance," however, is not synonymous with "receptivity," the value of affirmatively seeking to understand
another's point of view. As Johnson defines it, tolerance connotes open-mindedness and respect for
another point of view-but "not necessarily equal respect." Id. (emphasis in original). It is clearly not
a challenge to the insularity of our individuality.
87. This is not to suppose that the less powerful are undoubtedly the more virtuous, and therefore
do not have an obligation to listen to the views of others. Rather, the less powerful (within this group
I include all who must in large part repress their interpretations of reality) cannot avoid listening to
the dominant views in society, or, if the views of the dissidents and the conventions affirmed by the
community are mutually exclusive, in society's jails. See Barkun, Law and Social Revolution: Mille-
narianism and the Legal System, 6 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 113, 126-27 (1971) (analyzing powerful
socializing effect community exerts on nonconformist members).
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tion while denying its implications, for fully to admit the duty would be to
undermine its sanctification of autonomy.
Listening to competing constructions of reality and of law is a guiding
duty of our judiciary.88 It is a receptivity institutionalized, a receptivity
that nevertheless achieves the human contact which is its real purpose. As
Hoebel writes, "[a]n 'office' although culturally defined is, after all, exer-
cised by an individual. . . .Power defined through allocation of legal au-
thority is by its nature transpersonalized, yet by the nature of men it can
never be wholly depersonalized."89 Nor would liberal legality want it to
be: Our system must recognize as a direct effect of that human element
the success of the law in adapting, or in being adapted, to a changing
society.90 Subsequent to a "hearing" of different views-which it is the
lawyers' role to articulate as persuasively as possible-the judge selects
one alternative, thus constituting, amplifying or eroding a specific order.
Adjudication is thus formative: Like language, law is kept vital by its con-
frontation with different views; it is built by the decisions that ensue. 9
In light of the primacy of this personal operation in liberal legality, that
theory's denial of the element is striking. The official line is, of course,
that the judges find, rather than make law. Although most now reject the
response as a fiction, those who go so far as to emphasize the human
element for the random or systematic biases it introduces continue to find
mainstream response tepid at best and icy at times.92
If the fiction is in fact generally recognized as precisely that, it repre-
sents a needless incongruity between our present beliefs and our legal vo-
cabulary. What would happen if we recognized both the value of the
human receptivity offered by the judiciary-that "hearings" do take
place-and the limitations of that receptivity-that subjectivity is also
bias?
The behavior of the bench would remain "principled," according to our
practice, as indeed it must if it is to remain persuasive. The bench is
neither constrained nor legitimated by the fiction, but by something more
profound, by the going enterprise itself, the commitment of the commu-
88. Like the right to contribute, it is an ideal far from realized. Nevertheless, that it is an explicit
commitment is the significant point here.
89. E. HOEBEL, supra note 60, at 277-78.
90. See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 3-5 (1982) (on role
of common law tradition in particular); A. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW
(1976) (documenting judicial development of "laissez-faire constitutionalism").
91. For a rich development of the dynamic described here, see Cover, Forward: Nomos and Nar-
rative, 97 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1982).
92. See, e.g., Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222 (1984) (recommending
that those radically critical of legal system withdraw from teaching law); Martin, "Of Law and the
River," and of Nihilism and Academic Freedom, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1985) (responses to Car-
rington suggestion); J. FRANK, supra note 3, at viii-xxxi (Preface to Sixth Printing, responding to
critical reactions accumulated during 18 years since publication).
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nity. Whether the judge wants to change or to conserve the language of
power spoken by a society, he or she will use it to communicate. It is a
common tongue that evokes agreement and produces effect, while alien
approaches provoke misunderstanding, ridicule, reversal, official censure,
widespread noncompliance,"3 or lack of support from other branches."
'
Indeed the judge is not chosen, in either a hierarchical polity or an egali-
tarian one, unless he or she has demonstrated a "know-how" of the cur-
rent legal medium and a level of commitment to it.9" Rejecting the official
fiction would not give free rein to power, but could add responsibility to
its exercise: If the judicial voice is recognized as formative, the obligation
of judicial receptivity due from the state and its officers becomes emphatic.
At the level of ideals, perhaps the most effective but most elusive level, the
affirmative responsibility of receptivity could become as much stressed as
the right to counsel and a hearing. At a more practical level, recognition
would encourage the offering of new and creative arguments made on the
assumption that the legal vocabulary could expand. It would validate the
demystification and healthy scrutiny of court decisions. It could lead to
creative efforts to use the human element of the judiciary to good effect in
combatting the dangers that accompany the impersonality of a growing
government.96 Finally, awareness of that human element, while confirm-
ing the right of a community to require that its decision-makers be con-
versant in and committed to its continuing effort, would reveal as seriously
handicapped and handicapping a bench that did not reflect the heteroge-
neity of its community.
The judiciary provides a vital function in our system, one our vocabu-
lary should explicate rather than render enigmatic. But power is not lim-
ited to those who interpret the law; it is articulated also by those who
draft and enforce it. It thus becomes significant, both symbolically and
practically, that while we preserve the right of contribution for each indi-
93. The "all deliberate speed" qualification to forced desegregation is an example of a measure
used to mediate a controversial court decision and so lessen noncompliance. See Fiss, supra note 3, at
760-61.
94. Id. at 758 (noting that President Eisenhower's hesitation in deploying federal troops in Little
Rock raised possibility of lack of executive support).
95. See Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1325 (1984) (arguing that interpretation is not
constrained by external rules but is informed by assumptions and categories of understanding inherent
to context and practice). While I agree with Fish's "conventionalist" account of interpretation, my
conclusion that an obligation of receptivity follows from a recognition of our own contextuality is
obviously at odds with his assertion that no implications for practice follow from such an understand-
ing. Panel Discussion with Stanley Fish at Assoc. of Am. Law Schools seminar in San Francisco, Cal.
(Jan. 7, 1984) (available on AALS Audiostats Tape 56, "Law and the Humanities" series).
96. See, e.g., G. CAsRAnass, supra note 90 (suggesting that courts be given power to decide
whether retentionist or revisionist bias should apply to statutory as well as common law rules).
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vidual, we institutionalize the responsibility of receptivity in just one
office. 9 7
If the creation of law is a communicative process, then the state as a
whole functions as a crucible for the enterprise. Here power is localized,
concentrated in the human agency that designs, enacts, and enforces the
law. Here at every point when power and law are human should they be
challenged with the human perspectives of those absent.
Beginning once again at the most ambitious level, an internal shift to an
ideal of receptivity would make complacency and self-righteousness as dis-
tressing behaviors as we proclaim violence to be: All are barriers to real
communication. On the more tangible level,98 the state itself would focus
on the need to build receptivity into its infrastructure-the need to stimu-
late its personnel to listen actively. For example, although no longer so
interpreted,99 the right to petition originally included a duty of legislative
response.100 Attention to receptivity would imply a re-evaluation of this
duty to see if it could be made administratively practicable. As another
strategy, the tasks of designing and administering rules could be paired
with forms of feedback, such as interviewing, that would connect the indi-
vidual actualizing the law with those the law affects. Or we could simply
include within the jobs of those who make and enforce our laws a blatant
but perhaps effective investment aimed at increasing receptivity-a duty to
some regular exposure, some involving human contact, with those it would
not otherwise be within obligation or self-interest to encounter. Such de-
signs would not be unrelated to the plea, frequently expressed but seldom
defined, that we humanize the state and its bureaucracy.101
97. There is evidence that the responsibility has not always been so confined. Apparently, the
right to petition was originally interpreted to include a guaranteed response from the legislature. Seeinfra note 100. Political representatives are obviously still obligated to listen to their constituents.
That duty enables views to be expressed in political debate, and as such is an essential way in which
the right to contribute is institutionalized. See supra p. 985-86. By virtue of this purpose, and in
order to secure reelection, the representative generally emphasizes the dominant views of his or her
community. The extent to which his or her representative function ensures receptivity towards unpop-
ular, alien, or obscure views is therefore minimal. See also J. ELY, supra note 31, at 77-101 (discuss-
ing problem of underrepresentation of minority members).
98. To the following suggestions, it might be appropriate to add Unger's "destabilization rights":
"claims to the disruption of established institutions and forms of social practice that have achieved the
very sort of insulation and have contributed to the very kind of crystallized plan of social hierarchy
and division that the entire constitution wants to avoid." Unger, supra note 3, at 600. Such rights, in
theory, have the same goal as the suggestions presented here: All aim to challenge state indifference to
those without power. However, I am not yet clear about how destabilization rights would look inpractice. More importantly, the thrust of my argument here is that it is necessary to require more
from those with power rather than to rely only on rights given to those without it, a group frequently
disempowered from exercising rights they officially hold.
99. See Minnesota St. Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271 (1984) (right to
petition does not include guaranteed legislative response).
100. See R. BAILEY, POPULAR INFLUENCE UPON PUBLIC POLICY: PETITIONING IN EIGHT-
EENTH-CENTURY VIRGINIA 55, 166-69, 174 (1979).
101. It may also be related to another frequently advocated goal, the revival of an ethic of involved
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c. Objectification of the Law
Recognition of the selectivity of law and the responsibility of receptivity
that follows occupy an ambiguous place in American ideology because
they conflict with an idea of an individuality that is autonomous. A simi-
lar dynamic influences the objectification of law.
As we have seen, the assumption that each member of society is an
independefit agent endowed with some kind of acontextual rationality
leads to a notion of law as the codification of a social contract or as an
objective, neutral, and determinant body of principles. Such a notion is
becoming increasingly difficult to maintain. It presents an incongruity of
vocabulary and belief similar to others noted above. What would be the
result if we admitted that we do not believe it anymore?
Law would be examined as a creative process. Its rationales would be
vulnerable to the criticism that they did not respond to human needs and
conditions. In other words, legal argument probably would not change
much, since we have treated it as a supremely human medium all
along. 1 0
2
The admission would seem to affect more conspicuously those speaking
the language. The medium would clearly be their medium, notwithstand-
ing the possibility that it developed haphazardly, by contingencies, influ-
enced as much by disparate contributions as by a coherent plan. The areas
emphasized-the degree to which special vocabularies were developed and
intricacies explored-would remain profoundly their responsibility.
Recognition of this responsibility undermines one of the most well-worn
axioms in our legal system today-that its operators are neutral actors.
The recognition implies instead that each actor, by choosing his or her
role, contributing human resources, and concentrating physical resources,
affirms a certain portion of the arrangement. Elaboration or atrophy of
each area within the construction are as determinative of its final shape as
was its initial design.
The realization that objectivity is a status bestowed by us has a second
consequence, one which affects not only those facile in the speech of law,
but all under the law's jurisdiction. It reveals that the life of the law, its
legitimacy, is not established by a hypothetical contract or an equally hy-
pothetical consensus. It is achieved by remaining a common tongue recog-
nized by various members as sufficiently their own that they will struggle
with it and within it, rather than reject it by force, flight, or withdrawal.
Legitimacy is thus always an active and cumulative quantity: If won not
at all there will be mass societal revolution; if won at deep levels there
citizenship. See, e.g., Cornell, supra note 23, at 372.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 88-90.
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will be only small rebellions, expressed on the surface of society as con-
flicts of interpretation. Legitimacy is thus always, also, an aspiration.
0. The Human Factor
Liberalism gave us the vocabulary to articulate a vision for American
society and the terms with which to work toward its achievement. To call
that vision historic appropriately reflects its strength, but also implies its
limitation. For we now inhabit and acknowledge another world, a world
in which our inherited language must either expand or be rendered
anachronistic. One of liberalism's greatest achievements may be the op-
portunity it gives us to change it.
I am not suggesting that liberal jurisprudence give up its values of lib-
erty and equality-worthy ideals in anyone's vocabulary. Rather, I am
arguing that we cannot reach for them from the ideas of autonomy and
objectivity, as they have traditionally been defined. The recognition of in-
tersubjectivity and objectification as elements inherent to our action in the
social sphere reveals in a new way our responsibility in the dialogue and
decision that are law. It allows us to admit the insights of deconstruction
and to use them in a realistic way. It does not assert law to be rudderless
or lost in relativity. Rather, it locates law in our humanity, gives it a
voice, and asks it to answer.
